For decades the United States built a warfighting approach that relied on technological superiority, precision weapons and AI-assisted targeting to avoid costly ground wars. The current campaign against Iran increasingly shows the limits of that model: air strikes can produce tactical effects but often fail to deliver strategic defeat.
Mark Esper, who served as US Secretary of Defense during Donald Trump’s first term, told the Financial Times that the United States cannot achieve its strategic objectives through air attacks alone. Esper argued that continuing bombardments at the intensity seen months ago would not substantially change Iran’s stance, particularly regarding control of the Strait of Hormuz. He recommended long-term economic pressure backed by international support and warned that a protracted war would strain US weapons stocks and the defence budget.
By contrast, Donald Trump has threatened further and tougher strikes, naming not only military facilities but also Iranian power plants and bridges as potential targets. US operations so far have largely focused on Iran’s anti-ship capabilities — radar sites, missile emplacement points, command centres and vessels of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps — but the scope of strikes has broadened. For example, destroying a rail bridge in northeast Iran signalled Washington’s willingness to hinder Iranian commercial and military ties with China and Russia.
Suppression, not annihilation
Sascha Bruchmann of the International Institute for Strategic Studies says the US is currently suppressing rather than destroying Iran’s capabilities in the Strait of Hormuz. Continuous US air patrols, A‑10 aircraft and Apache helicopters complicate the movement of smaller Iranian vessels and their ability to identify commercial targets, but radars, cameras and command systems can be repaired or replaced, so the effects of strikes are generally temporary.
The mutual strikes have already reduced shipping: daily oil shipments fell in a week from 9.4 million barrels to 5.5 million barrels. Heightened tensions pushed Brent crude back above $84 per barrel, and gas and fuel prices have risen. Analysts note that neither side has an interest in full-scale war, but reciprocal military responses can trigger an escalation spiral; the Eurasia Group estimates a 55 percent chance the conflict will deepen in the next month.
AI’s limits when data are scarce
The United States and Israel have heavily integrated artificial intelligence into targeting in recent years. Systems such as the Maven Smart System, developed by Palantir, fuse satellite imagery, drone footage, electronic intelligence and other sources to prioritise targets and speed attack decisions. These AI-enabled tools can assemble profiles from thousands of data points and greatly accelerate the production of strike lists.
However, AI’s advantage endures only when sufficient, high-quality data exist. Iran’s warfare does not rely on large, easily identifiable bases: it moves missile launchers, decentralises command, stores much equipment underground, and organises communications to leave minimal digital traces. Iranian forces also use civilian ships for surveillance and targeting. These practices blur the line between military targets and civilian infrastructure and limit what AI can detect. If a launch site is active only briefly, an observation ship appears civilian, or orders move by offline channels, AI-powered systems lose much of their edge.
Bruchmann argues Iran has deliberately created an information-poor environment: cheap, dispersed and quickly replaceable systems that reduce the lasting effect of bombing. US and Israeli forces can achieve tactical successes — destroying radars, missile sites or vessels — but cannot, at present, eliminate the underlying network that regenerates those capabilities.
What comes next?
A central dynamic of the conflict is that Iran does not need to defeat the United States militarily; it only needs to maintain persistent uncertainty in the Strait of Hormuz. If mines, drones, missiles and small boats make commercial navigation risky, insurance costs rise, traffic falls and oil prices increase — generating economic pressure on the West. Tehran can thus play for time while Washington faces the dual challenge of sustaining military pressure and keeping negotiation channels open.
If Washington and Israel aim to permanently deny Iran the ability to exert military pressure in the Strait of Hormuz, they will eventually confront tasks that cannot be accomplished by air strikes alone. That does not make a full-scale ground invasion inevitable, but it increases the likelihood that limited ground operations or special forces missions will be considered. The United States and Israel will soon face a choice: accept the continued partial persistence of Iranian military capabilities, or escalate to a riskier operational level.
