Jensen Huang, Nvidia’s chief executive, left the company after growing questions about extramarital relationships, according to the source article. Attention first focused on his relationship with an executive at Megaspeed, a Singapore data-center company, before reports emerged of two separate relationships with Nvidia employees.
U.S. investigators suspect Megaspeed of funneling Nvidia chips to China. Megaspeed has denied wrongdoing. The developments also raise questions about what Nvidia’s security team knew about government scrutiny of Megaspeed and Huang’s relationships, and whether it raised any concerns.
A change in security leadership
According to the account, Huang’s departure came roughly two and a half months after David Reber stepped down in August as Nvidia’s chief security officer and head of product security. Reber had spent seven years at the company, including four as chief security officer. In a LinkedIn post in late August, he cited health reasons for his decision and disclosed that he had been diagnosed with young-onset Parkinson’s disease more than two years earlier.
His successor, Saša Zdjelar, previously spent 17 years at ExxonMobil in Houston, leaving as a senior IT manager. He then spent a year at Salesforce and several years at cybersecurity company ReversingLabs. Zdjelar did not answer questions on Thursday about the transition or what the security team knew. Reber and Nvidia also did not respond to related inquiries.
Nothing public connects the changes in Reber’s or Zdjelar’s roles to the Megaspeed matter. It is also unclear whether information about Huang’s relationships or the investigation reached the security team.
What people inside the company knew
The New York Times reported earlier in the week that Nvidia’s top lawyer had been involved with the government’s Megaspeed inquiry more than a year earlier. Nvidia has said it regularly contacts officials.
Reports about the employee relationships suggest some colleagues knew parts of the story, although Nvidia’s code of conduct does not expressly forbid such behavior. The New York Times cited five Nvidia employees in reporting a relationship with a vice president who reported directly to Huang. Reuters later reported a second relationship, citing two people.
Relationships between a chief executive and employees are usually handled by human resources, legal staff and the board, rather than security. But security specialists say an affair an executive wants to conceal can give a foreign intelligence service leverage. The relationship with the Megaspeed executive, moreover, was not an internal workplace matter.
The risks of personal contacts
Retired senior intelligence officer Nicholas Eftimiades says warning signs can be difficult to detect because intelligence gathering often relies on everyday conversations rather than hacking. Eftimiades, who says he has trained more than 1,000 corporate security professionals, wrote a book on Chinese espionage operations and tactics in 2020.
He says corporate security teams often have limited resources: because they do not generate revenue, many executives support only the spending needed for compliance. Other specialists say companies also tend to define security too narrowly.
In an opinion article in The Hill, Don Aviv, chief executive of corporate investigations firm Interfor International, and author Jeremy Hurewitz argued that security teams should pay more attention to insider risks alongside facility protection, cyberattack prevention and physical threats. Those risks include relationships cultivated with executives and employees by foreign intelligence services, suspicious business ties, conflicts of interest and attempts to obtain sensitive information.
Eftimiades offered a hypothetical example, not referring to Huang: if an executive tells a contact that the board is blocking a decision, that could help an intelligence service identify someone to target. The service might then look for access to that person’s email or phone.
The information sought may be policy insight rather than technology, such as who is pushing to change export rules and who is opposing them. Eftimiades said the approach is not new, particularly in China’s case, but that relationships cultivated today often last years rather than the weeks more typical of Soviet-era spying.
Technology and further investigations
Technology can supplement human intelligence. Eftimiades pointed to IMSI catchers, which mimic cell towers and induce nearby phones to connect. He said a basic model that fits in a suitcase can cost about $1,000, while government-grade devices cost much more. He added that the devices featured in a couple of Chinese espionage cases in the previous year.
Eftimiades said it is not yet known whether such a device was used against Huang. He suggested Huang’s phone was presumably hardened so that a compromise could at least be detected.
As the Nvidia board’s independent investigation and federal inquiries proceed, they may clarify what the company’s security team knew and whether it could have acted. Eftimiades hopes the episode will serve as a warning to U.S. industry. He estimates that the United States has lost trillions of dollars in intellectual property, though the source provides no supporting evidence for that estimate.



